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BOOK REVIEWS
The Six Legal Dimensions of the Vietnam War. BY RICHARD A. FALK.
Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1968. Pp. 53. $2.00.
Richard A. Falk in The Six Legal Dimensions of the Vietnam War
provides a valuable survey of the legal issues involved in the making of
foreign policy in the nuclear age; however, he offers no practical solutions to these problems. At the outset Mr. Falk states his belief that the
participation of the United States in the Vietnam War is illegal, but he
admits that others hold a contrary view. His stated purpose is not to be
diverted into a discussion of such illegality, but rather to proceed with
suggestions regarding improvement of the decision-making power in
United States foreign policy.
Using the Geneva Accords of 1954, the United Nations Charter, the
Peace Treaty of Westphalia, the Hague Conventions of 1907, the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Tonkin Resolution, and the Nuremberg
Trials as touchstones, the author analyzes the decision of the United States
to come to the aid of South Vietnam and finds the decision without legal
justification.
So that similar ill-fated decisions may be avoided in the future, Mr.
Falk suggests that the traditional concept of separation of powers in the
formation of foreign policy must be re-examined. Specifically, he recommends that the structure of the executive branch be altered and that
Congress and the courts play a more significant role in the development
of our foreign policy.
First, Mr. Falk recommends that a new position of Attorney
General for International Affairs be created at the cabinet level. This
person, it is contemplated, would operate "somewhat independent of the
internal political power struggles in decision making circles in Washington." 1 His function would be to urge that international law be considered
in all foreign policy decisions. Such an officer's power would be illusory,
however, as Senator Robert F. Kennedy effectively pointed out in his
June, 1968, debate with Senator Eugene McCarthy: A cabinet officer
cannot have an autonomous existence; he is merely an appointee of the
President-who possesses all real authority. The Attorney General for
International Affairs, having no independent authority, would undoubtedly
suffer frustrations similar to those suffered by those representatives to the
United Nations who accepted the position with the unrealistic view that
they would have a significant voice in the determination of foreign policy.
The author urges that the role of Congress in the evolution of foreign
policy be enhanced. Such comments sound strikingly similar to the persistent complaints of Senator Robert A. Taft in the early 1950's that
1.
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President Harry Truman would consult Congress on foreign policy "only
on the landings and not on the take-offs." Mr. Falk commends Senator
J. William Fulbright for his repeated criticism of President Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam War. Fulbright, it should be remembered,
was just as critical of President Truman's handling of the Korean War
and in January, 1951, called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.
But Mr. Falk's recommendations as to how to achieve a strengthening of
the role of Congress in foreign policy decisions is disappointing. His
proposal is that the time-tested vehicle for inaction-a presidential commission-be established to study the "question of legislative-executive relations in a period of war and come forth with recommendations as to
how these relations might be reconstituted for the future."'2 In these fastpaced days the utility of such study commissions is limited.
The third solution offered by Mr. Falk is that the courts reappraise the
political question doctrine so that they can evaluate action in the area of
foreign policy. This solution is appalling. If there is one area where the
impact of public opinion is not felt-and rightly so-it is the federal judiciary, where judges sit with lifetime tenure. Such a system is necessary
for stability, as public opinion is subject to volatile changes. For example,
defense spending does not have overwhelming support today, but in
1960, Richard Nixon, in his campaign for the Presidency, could gain the
support of Governor Nelson Rockefeller only after Nixon agreed to call for
increased defense spending. Similarly, John F. Kennedy, as part of his
program to "get America moving," demanded more defense spending.
If courts were to evaluate foreign policy, the Senate could justifiably
inquire of a nominee for the Supreme Court whether he was a "hawk" or
"dove," isolationist or internalist, or pro or anti-foreign aid. Ever since
the disgraceful inquisition of Justice Abe Fortas when he was nominated
for Chief Justice, Senate battles over Supreme Court nominations have
become increasingly political. What is needed is a step back from the
acrimony of recent advise and consent disputes. Mr. Falk's suggestion
would further politicize the Senate debates on Supreme Court nominations.
Mr. Falk does provide one surprise. He argues against the current conventional wisdom that United States forces should be activated only pursuant to a declaration of war by Congress. He states that a declaration of
war might make limited objectives impossible. He reasons that a domestic
war psychology might cause dissent to be viewed as treason and also that
Communist countries might be pressured into activation of collective security agreements upon such a declaration. While Mr. Falk deems the
United States' action in Korea legal-principally because the United Nations approved the action while Russia was boycotting the Security Council-the fact is that President Truman committed United States forces
without seeking a declaration of war by Congress. This action by Truman, however, strengthened his refusal to submit to General Douglas
McArthur's call for an escalation of the war into Manchuria in order to remove the "privileged sanctuaries."
2. Id. at 34.
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Richard A. Falk has pinpointed several areas of foreign policy which
definitely require improvement; however, his suggestions cannot be seriously considered as possible solutions.
DANIEL P. COMAN*
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